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People are susceptible to an array of cognitive biases, which can
result in systematic errors and deviations from rational decision
making. Over the past decade, an increasing amount of attention
has been paid towards investigating how cognitive biases influence
information seeking and retrieval behaviours and outcomes. In par-
ticular, how such biases may negatively affect decisions because,
for example, searchers may seek confirmatory but incorrect infor-
mation or anchor on an initial search result even if its incorrect. In
this perspectives paper, we aim to: (1) bring together and catalogue
the emerging work on cognitive biases in the field of Information
Retrieval; and (2) provide a critical review and reflection on these
studies and subsequent findings. During our analysis we report
on over thirty studies, that empirically examined cognitive biases
in search, providing over forty key findings related to different
domains (e.g. health, web, socio-political) and different parts of the
search process (e.g. querying, assessing, judging, etc.). Our reflec-
tion highlights the importance of this research area, and critically
discusses the limitations, difficulties and challenges when investi-
gating this phenomena along with presenting open questions and
future directions in researching the impact — both positive and
negative — of cognitive biases in Information Retrieval.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Information Seeking and Retrieval (ISR) is a process of searching, dis-
covering and finding relevant, useful, and credible information [30].
Many factors impact upon how people undertake this process, shape
their search behaviours, and effect their search performances. Over
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the years, researchers have investigated user characteristics (e.g., ex-
pertise, background, topic knowledge, cognitive abilities, etc.), sys-
tem functionalities (e.g., interface, presentation, quality, etc.), task
attributes (e.g., task difficulty, complexity, topicality, etc.) [36, 40]
and many other factors. More recently, there has been growing in-
terest in exploring how cognitive biases influence people’s ISR and
how they impact upon people’s information processing, knowledge
acquisition and decision making. Of particular concern to the field
is whether the influence of cognitive biases may be exacerbated
due to the instantaneous access to unprecedented volumes of in-
formation, and exploited by search engines and content creators,
deliberately or inadvertently [7, 12? ]. Concerns have also been
raised over whether cognitive biases may also interact with search
engine biases, algorithmic biases and content biases [5, 78], or lead
to such system sided biases [13, 31] creating a vicious cycle where:
“bias begets bias” [7]. Taken together, these system- and user-sided
biases may compound together, amplifying the effects both posi-
tively and negatively [45]. And, so with an increasing amount of
the population turning to search and recommender systems to ac-
cess, find and consume information in order to make important life
decisions, regarding for example, medical, political, social, personal
and financial choices, investigating the influence and impact of
cognitive biases with ISR is of economic and societal importance.
In this paper, we aim to bring together the research on cognitive
biases in ISR, cataloguing the main cognitive biases that have been
observed in ISR studies — and categorising these studies in terms
of their search domain and which part of the search process the
cognitive biases manifest. Then, in our discussion, we critically
reflect upon this prior work and consider, “whether we as researchers
are suffering from the Observer-Expectancy Effect?”, while detailing
the difficulties, limitations and challenges in studying the influence
and impact of cognitive biases in search.
2 COGNITIVE BIASES AND HEURISTICS
A cognitive bias is a systematic pattern of deviations in thinking
which may lead to errors in judgements and decision-making [74,
75]. These deviations often refer to the difference from what is
normatively expected given rational decision making models (e.g.,











Figure 1: Thinking, Slow and Fast [32]: Cognitive biases [74],
or simple heuristics that make us smart? [73]
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According to Kahneman [32], cognitive biases arise due to the
tension between two conceptual systems within people’s brains:
System 1 being automatic, fast and intuitive; and System 2 being
conscious, slow and analytical (see Fig. 1).When system 1 dominates
thinking, it can lead to faster decisions, but they can be error prone
(see Fig. 2). This is because the biases (and heuristics applied to
think fast) affect the way in which people perceive and process
new information, especially if the information is counter-intuitive,
conflicting or induces uncertainty [74]. When system 2 thinking is
engaged, it tends to be more reliable but requires more cognitive
effort and slows down the decision making process. While it is
typically assumed that cognitive biases have a negative impact
leading to poorer decisions [74], this is not necessarily always the
case, all of the time. Instead cognitive biases may simplify decision-
making by reducing the amount of information and uncertainty that
has to be processed [32]. And, thus act as mechanisms that enables
fast and frugal decision making that makes people smart [73]. For
example, people can develop information-processing shortcuts that
lead to more effective actions in a given context, or enable faster
decisions when timeliness is more valuable than accuracy. So rather
than being universally detrimental to decision making, it has been
shown that these fast and frugal heuristics that people employ
result in good decisions most of the time [24, 73]. This is because,
they argue, that people seeks to do their best, with their available
information processing capabilities, given the constraints of the
environments (e.g., bounded or computational rationality) [25, 48,
70]. Essentially, cognitive biases can have both positive and negative
impacts – though most of the literature within ISR has focused on
their negative impacts.
Since the seminal work by Tversky and Kahneman [74] over 180
different biases and effects have been identified [10]. These have
been broadly categorised into four high level groupings depending
on: (i) the amount of information available/presented; (ii) the lack
of meaning associated with the information; (iii) the need to act fast;
and (iv) what information is remembered or recalled [10]. Below,
we describe these four categories, and within these categories, we
describe the subset of cognitive biases that have been empirically
examined within ISR studies (see Table 1).
A bat and a ball cost 110 cents in total.
The bat costs 100 cents more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?
Figure 2: A cognitive reflection test question:What’s thefirst
answer that came to your mind? Was it correct1?
2.1 Too Much Information
Being overloaded by the amount of information accessible and
available may lead to: (i) noticing things already primed in memory
or that are repeated often (e.g., Availability Bias); (ii) noticing when
something has changed or how it is presented (e.g., Framing Effects);
(iii) drawn to details that support existing beliefs (e.g., Anchoring
Bias, Confirmation Bias); (iv) noticing visually striking things; and
(v) noticing flaws in others more easily than ourselves.
1The answer is 5 cents. In [55], only 52% of participants were correct.
Availability Bias leads people to overestimate the likelihood of
an answer or stance based on how easily it can be retrieved and
recalled [74]. Within the context of search, this may mean searchers
are more susceptible to system and content biases which promotes
content of a particular stance [78], and further compounded be-
cause of the Google Effect, where people tend to rely on retrieving
information via search engines, rather than remembering it [72].
FramingEffects occurwhen peoplemake different decisions given
the same information because of how the information has been
presented. The classic experiment on framing asked participants
which treatment to choose—where the options are presented in
terms of the lives saved, or the resulting deaths [74]. In search,
framing the presentation of results may also lead the searcher to
different perceptions about the topic [53, 54].
Anchoring Bias stems from people’s tendencies to focus too much
on the first piece of information learnt, or observed (even if that
information is not relevant or correct) [74]. Anchoring effects may
be due to short term anchoring (e.g., an initial result presented
may colour the person’s opinion on the topic [69]), or stem from
entrenched prior beliefs that influence how new information pre-
sented during the course of searching is processed and used to
make a decision [46].
Confirmation Bias stems from people’s tendency to prefer con-
firmatory information, where they will discount information that
does not conform to their existing beliefs [51]. When querying, this
may manifest as people employing positive test strategies where
they try to find information that supports their hypotheses. While,
when assessing they may actively dismiss or disregard information
that contradicts their hypotheses [42, 76].
2.2 Not Enough Meaning
Experiencing certain events may lead to, for example, (i) finding
patterns in sparse data ; (ii) stereotyping or generalising based on
prior histories (e.g., Authority/Trust Bias, Bandwagon Effects); (iii)
attributing positive attributes to familiar things (e.g., Reinforcement
Effects, Exposure Effects); (iv) simplifying probabilities and numbers
so they are easier to process; (v) assuming that we know what other
people are thinking (e.g., Curse of Knowledge); and (vi) projecting
our current mindset onto the past and future (e.g., Projection Bias).
Bandwagon Effects occur when people take on a similar opinion
or point of view because other people voice that opinion or point of
view. This is also referred to as Group Think or Herd Behaviour. For
example, the inclusion of popularity and other social indicators, may
lead to searchers taking a query suggestion [38], adopting a similar
political stance [27], or making a similar judgement regardless of
its integrity or accuracy [17].
Reinforcement Effects are related to Bandwagon Effects, and oc-
cur when a stimulus is repeatedly shown to a person, they develop
a more positive attitude towards that stimulus. So, if a search result
page returns many results purporting a similar stance, this may
sway voter opinions [19] or lead searchers to conclude that an
ineffective treatment is helpful [46].
Exposure Effects are similar to reinforcement effects, but with
respect to the amount of time and number of times people spend
engaging with the stimulus. So the more time (and times) a person
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spends engaging with information of a particular stance, viewpoint,
etc., and the more exposures they have spread over a period of time,
it will tend to lead to a more positive impression of that stance,
viewpoint, etc. [19, 46, 78].
2.3 Needing to Act Fast
Making decisions under time pressure (or very quickly) may lead to
biases in decision making, involving: (i) favouring simple options
with complete information over complex, ambiguous options (e.g.,
Ambiguity Effects, Less is More); (ii) avoiding mistakes by preserving
autonomy, group status and avoiding irreversible decisions (e.g.,
Decoy Effects, Status Quo Bias); (iii) getting things done, by focusing
on completing tasks where time and effort has been invested (e.g.,
Sunken Cost Fallacy); (iv) staying focused by favouring immediate,
relatable and available things (e.g., Novelty Bias, Recency Bias); and
(v) being confident to act and feeling the actions are important (e.g.,
Dunning-Kruger Effect, Overconfidence Bias).
Ambiguity Effects occur when several options are presented, peo-
ple tend to avoid options in which there is high uncertainty in the
outcome, even if it is favourable [20]. In search, this may mani-
fest in the selection of result items from known, trusted sources
that provide reliable information, rather than selecting items from
unknown sources for which there is high uncertainty [34].
Less is More Effects arise due to the paradox of choice [68]. When
many options are presented, people find it harder to make compar-
isons, and often will not make any decisions or be less satisfied in
the decision that they make —because there are so many options
available. Reducing the number of results presented may lead to
people being more satisfied in their selection [56].
Decoy Effects occur when people’s preferences for options A or B
changes in favour of option B, when a third option C is introduced,
where option C is inferior to option B. Option C is the decoy and can
be clearly distinguished as inferior when compared to B, making
the comparison between the two cognitively less taxing. However,
choosing between A and B is more cognitively taxing, as A maybe
be better in one respect, while B in another. Thus, people are more
likely to favour B when C is included. This is also referred to as
the Asymmetric Dominance Effect [28]. In the context of selecting
between result items (where one is relevant, and one is not-relevant),
the introduction of another non-relevant item which is similar but
dominated by the other non-relevant item may deceive searchers
into selecting a non-relevant item [17].
Dunning-Kruger Effect arises when people (who are generally
less competent) overestimate their capabilities in performing a task –
and stems for their inability to recognize their lack of capability [16].
When searching, such searchers may then overestimate their ability
to find or identity relevant items, which may result in judging non-
relevant items as relevant [22].
2.4 What to Remember
The need to be selective in retaining information from all that is
available may lead to: (i) discarding specifics for generalities (e.g.,
Fading Affect Bias, Negativity Bias); (ii) reducing events and lists to
their key elements (e.g., Recency and Primacy Effects, Peak-End Rule,
Misinformation Effect); (iii) storing memories depending on how
they are experienced; and (iv) editing and reinforcing memories
after the fact.
Priming Effects occur when a person’s exposure to a stimulus sub-
consciously influences their response to subsequent stimuli. These
stimuli are often related to words or images that people see during
the search session. For example, the images and results returned
in response to a query may prime the search, activating particu-
lar mental concepts that influences their subsequent perceptions
– which may lead to very unsavoury, offensive or inappropriate
associations being made and propagated (see [52]).
Order effects refer to effects based on the order in which infor-
mation is presented and processed and how that ordering may
influence the final decision [74]. These effects can be based on [14]:
• Primacy where a person’s decision is influenced by the
initial information presented in a given sequence/list; and
• Recency where a person’s decision is influenced by the
latter information presented in a given sequence/list.
In search, primacy order effects may mean searchers are given more
weight to information presented earlier in the ranked lists relative
to information given further down—unless they examine lots of
result items, in which case the recency order effects may have a
greater impact on their decisions [8, 46].
Peak EndRule is a cognitive bias that influences how people recall
experiences, where highly charged positive or negative moments
during that experience are considered the “peaks”—and the final
moments of the experience are considered the “end”—are weighted
more heavily in their assessment. For example, the user’s search sat-
isfaction may be highly influenced by these peak and end moments
experienced during their search session [49].
The above list of biases outlined is not exhaustive, and only repre-
sents the majority of cognitive biases that have been studied within
ISR contexts specifically (see Table 1). It should be noted that many
other cognitive biases, heuristics and effects are also likely to in-
fluence ISR behaviours (such as Attentional Bias, Negativity Bias,
Information Bias, Choice-Support Bias, Judgment Bias, etc.). How-
ever, we do not have space to review these all here. Instead, we
refer the reader to the work by Gluck [26] and the work by Be-
himehr and Jamali [9] where they have both performed qualitative
studies identifying other possible biases that could arise during ISR.
In practice, however, given the vast array of cognitive biases, it is
often difficult to tease out exactly which cognitive bias influences or
shapes a particular decision. More likely, as many interactions are
being performed during the search process, a series of heuristics
and mental shortcuts will be invoked, leading to a combination
of different cognitive biases having an influence [9]. In ISR, it is
largely unknown whether: (i) certain cognitive biases dominate
other cognitive biases, (ii) if combinations of cognitive bias com-
pound together leading to greater errors in thinking [45], (iii) if
certain combinations of cognitive biases may wash out any nega-
tive or positive effects, and (iv) whether certain cognitive biases,
or combinations of, could be invoked to positively influence the
searcher to make better decisions [8, 18, 47, 81]. In the literature,
however, most research has sought to identify cognitive biases and
their negative impacts.
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Table 1: A breakdown of ISR papers investigating different cognitive biases
across domains and different parts of the search process.
.
Cognitive Biases Domains Search Process
Health Political Web Querying Examining Judging Sat.
Confirmation Bias [23] [41] [61] [63] [33] [44] [43] [62] [41] [62] [63] [76] [77] [23] [61] [43]
[76] [77] [83] [33] [44]
Too Much Anchoring [46] [61] [53] [54] [17] [69] [53] [54] [17] [46] [61] [69]
Information Availability [23] [61] [79] [53] [54] [53] [54] [23] [61]
Framing Effects [53] [54] [53] [54]
Bandwagon Effects [18] [23] [27] [17] [11] [38] [38] [11] [17] [18] [27] [23]
No Meaning Exposure Effects [23] [46] [61] [43] [19] [19] [23] [43] [46] [61]
Reinforcement Effects [46] [43] [19] [19] [43] [46]
Decoy Effects [17] [17]
Act Fast Ambiguity Effects [43] [33] [17] [29] [34] [33] [17] [29] [34] [43]
Less is More [56] [56]
Dunning-Kruger Effect [22] [22]
Priming Effect [53] [54] [39] [62] [67] [81] [62] [81] [53] [54] [67] [39]
Remember Order Effects [8] [46] [61] [1] [19] [11] [35] [50] [80] [11] [35] [50] [80] [1] [8] [19] [46] [61]
Peak End Rule [49] [49]
3 OVERVIEW OF COGNITIVE BIASES IN IS&R
To seed the discussion and analysis presented in this perspective’s
paper, we performed a literature review seeking out works in the
field of ISR which had performed studies related to cognitive biases
specifically, and excluded studies related to algorithmic biases2. We
identified thirty-five papers that empirically explored the influence
of cognitive biases where they test or investigate specific cognitive
biases quantitatively, or using a mixed design, and two papers
that performed qualitative studies that identify potential cognitive
biases that may manifest during the ISR process [9, 26].
Table 1 reports the papers presenting empirical studies bro-
ken down by the different cognitive biases presented in Section 2,
grouped by the domain: (i) Health and Medical, (ii) Socio-Political,
and (iii) Web, and by different parts of the search process: (i) query-
ing, (ii) examining result lists, (iii) judging result items, and (iv)
assessing search satisfaction. Note that our groupings are not mu-
tually exclusive, and so papers can appear in multiple categories.
Below, we present an overview of the key findings from studies
in the Health and Socio-Political domains, specifically, and then
describe the key findings with respect to the different parts of the
search process (as these are mainly web related, these have been
combined together rather than repeated).
3.1 Cognitive Biases in Health Search
Utilizing search engines to find health and medical information rep-
resents a critical domain, as what, where and when the information
is presented [46, 47, 78, 79], and how it combines with the searcher’s
prior beliefs [61, 76] can have a significant impact on health deci-
sions and outcomes [66, 83]. For example, White and Horvitz [79]
found that a disproportionate amount of results are returned that
overly exaggerate the seriousness of benign conditions (Availabil-
ity Bias). Coupled with people’s difficulty in understanding base
rates (Base Rates Fallacy), this can lead searchers to overestimate
the likelihood of them having a particular condition (referred to
as Cyberchrondia). Many of the studies performed in this domain
have used search tasks for which there are clinical answers given
Cochrane systematic reviews, such as “does cinnamon help diabetes?”
(unhelpful), “Does caffeine help asthma?’’ (helpful), etc.. By using
such search tasks with known clincial answers, researchers have an
2Note that our review was not a systematic review, and so is not exhaustive, but we
believe that it does contain most of the relevant works performed in the area to date.
objective way to evaluate the accuracy of people’s beliefs, the qual-
ity of their selections, and veracity of their answers. Researchers
have found that:
HM1 Searchers tend to pose positively framed queries e.g. “does
Aloe Vera cure cancer?” which suggests a form of Projection Bias,
where searcher queries may be indicative of their prior belief’s,
i.e. that Aloe Vera does cure cancer [61, 76].
HM2 Searchers tend to select results that confirm their beliefs ex-
pressed in the query (Confirmation Bias) [77]. However, health
web content is often biased toward positively framed answers
e.g. documents promoting Aloe Vera and its benefits for cancer
treatment (Content Bias [76, 77]).
HM3 Searchers tend to anchor on the first result, regardless of
whether it is positive (saying the treatment does help) or nega-
tive (saying that the treatment does not help), and was more
influential on their final answer in [46, 61] (i.e. primacy effects),
but the converse was found in [1] (i.e. recency effects).
HM4 Searchers appear to value subsequent results less and less,
and so latter results have a diminishing influence on their final
answer, such that the last result examined had little or the least
influence on their final answer in [46], but the converse was
found in [1].
HM5 However, searchers who encountered many correct (incor-
rect) answers would be more likely to give a correct (incor-
rect) answer (suggesting Availability Bias and/or Exposure Ef-
fects) [1, 23].
HM6 Taken together HM1-5 suggest that it is not clear whether a
person’s existing prior belief, the initial anchor, and/or subse-
quent results viewed will influence their decision.
HM7 When searchers invested more effort in the search task, by
issuing more queries, and inspecting more items, the accuracy
of their answers improved [61].
HM8 The more domain knowledge searchers had, prior to search-
ing, the more accurate their answers, as they could articulate
their queries more precisely, and better understand medical jar-
gon [41]. But, imprecise representations of medical conditions
lead searchers to consider more irrelevant information, as well
as seeking out information that confirmed their initial belief
(Confirmation Bias).
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HM9 It was hypothesised that searchers with more domain knowl-
edge can better filter out irrelevant information (Selective Ex-
posure), and that once they encounter the first credible and
reasonable answer that they will stop searching (Satisfice) [41].
Finally, a number of other studies have examined whether it is
possible to mitigate these observed biases, or even use biases to
nudge people into making better decisions in the health context [8,
18, 47]. Following on from their study in [46], Lau and Coiera [47]
created interfaces to help mitigate Order Effects and Anchoring Bias.
They found that Order Effects could be mitigated to some extent, but
not the Anchoring Bias (HM10). Bansback et al. [8] exploited Order
Effects when presenting information to patients, which led to more
informed choices about treatments (HM11). While, more recently,
Elsweiler et al. [18] tried to nudge participants towards healthy
recipes by manipulating the attractiveness of the recipes presented
(using Attractiveness Bias) which led to participant’s selecting lower
fat recipes (62% of the time, given two choices) (HM12).
3.2 Cognitive Biases in Socio-Political Search
Deciding on what party to support, whether to become vegan, or
deciding to legalize cannabis, represent just a few examples of differ-
ent socio-political decisions that people may turn to search engines
to help inform their opinions [44, 53]. Researchers have been con-
cerned that search engines may be influencing people’s opinions,
either by presenting confirmatory information reinforcing people’s
existing beliefs [33, 43], or by presenting information to sway their
decisions through exposure effects (dubbed the Search Engine Ma-
nipulation Effect (SEME) [19]). Similar to health related studies,
researchers typically asked participant’s their prior beliefs regard-
ing which way they would vote or their opinion on a controversial
topic (such as “gun control”, “abortion legalisation”, etc.). Then after
interaction with a search system or result list, they asked them to
vote or rate their position again, so that shifts in attitude could be
measured [43]. From these socio-policitial studies, researchers have
found that:
SP1 Searchers viewed articles for significantly less time, when the
articles were not consistent with their prior beliefs on the topic.
While, they spent longer on articles that were consistent [43]
(suggesting Information Avoidance Bias and Confirmation Bias) .
SP2 Searchers who spent more time viewing articles consistent
with their prior beliefs, strengthen their beliefs on the topic [43]
(suggesting Exposure Effects and Reinforcement Effects).
SP3 Searchers spent longer viewing articles that were more credi-
ble [43, 53, 54] (suggesting Authority and Ambiguity Biases).
SP4 While, it was hypothesised that results inconsistent with prior
beliefs would be rated as less credible due to potential Con-
firmation Bias, it was found that the prior beliefs of searchers
had little influence on their judgments of the credibility of the
results [33].
SP5 Searchers rated articles as more useful if they were easier to
read and understand, which they attribute to Availability Bias,
and searchers engaged less with more complex articles that
required more effort to process [53, 54].
SP6 When presented with a list of results, Order Effects and Expo-
sure Effects could sway non-voters3 towards favouring a par-
ticular political candidate by roughly 20%, depending on how
many results and at what rank the favoured candidate’s results
were positioned. However, despite non-voters, evaluating and
selecting one candidate before examining the result list, no
anchoring effects were observed [19].
3.3 Cognitive Biases when Querying
In addition to the works previously mentioned examining Confir-
mation Bias when querying in the Health domain, other studies
have examined how searchers may be primed by the querying func-
tionality, either via query auto-complete or query and question
suggestions, and how popularity information regarding the sugges-
tions may influence search behaviour. Researchers have found:
Q1 Searchers selection of query suggestions was not influenced by
the displayed popularity of the query suggestion (suggesting
that participants were not jumping on the bandwagon) [38].
Q2 Instead, searchers selected query suggestions that were per-
ceived to be, and were, of higher quality (i.e. more likely to
retrieve relevant content) [38].
Q3 Searchers, when primed with query auto-completions to pro-
mote more critical thinking, did not engage longer with the
search task (as hypothesized by Yamamoto and Yamamoto [81]).
Q4 More educated searchers, when primedwith query auto-completions
to promote critical thinking, issued more queries, checked the
quality of sources more carefully, and selected higher quality
articles that contained valid references [81].
Q5 In terms of querying behaviour, it was hypothesized that a
search system that presented results that were inconsistent
with the searcher’s beliefs would lead to lower search engage-
ment and less querying. However, they found that searchers
issued more queries and spent longer searching, trying to find
information to confirm their beliefs [63]. Note that the search
results were manipulated to return answers not consistent with
the searchers beliefs, even if those answers were factually in-
correct. The repeated querying and exposure to the alternative
view, tended to sway searchers beliefs (suggesting Exposure
Effects)[63] .
Q6 When searchers were presented with suggested questions via a
“People also asked” component, which provided answers incon-
sistent with searcher’s prior beliefs, it led to search disengage-
ment, fewer queries, less exploration of documents, and less
time searching. So rather than mitigating Confirmation Bias as
hypothesized by Pothirattanachaikul et al. [62], it actually led
to Information Avoidance.
3.4 Cognitive Biases when Examining Lists
A phenomena that has been observed in many contexts, but in
particular, during web search, is what is referred to by system sided
researchers as Position Bias [13, 31]. This is where highly ranked
3It should be noted that participants in the study were deciding among candidates from
another country running for an election that they had no vested interest in and could
not vote in. Also, they could not search for other information about the candidates,
only examine the fabricated/mock result list presented to them.
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documents tend to attract more clicks than results ranked lower –
and so there is an exponential decrease in the number of clicks as
rank increases. When examining result lists other biases have also
been noted, such as:
• Attractiveness Bias where searchers tend to prefer more
attractive results over less attractive [82],
• DomainBiaswhere searchers judge resultsmore favourably
from known domains (reducing uncertainty) [29, 34], and,
• Authority/Trust Bias where searchers tend to trust the
search engine rankings because they come from a perceived
authority [57, 58].
Researchers have naturally considered whether these biases ob-
served on the system side (which lead to evaluation issues and
algorithmic biases where the rich-get-richer [12]), stem from cog-
nitive biases on the user side [7]. Of interest, has been whether
searchers follow Zipf’s Law [84], the Principle of Least Effort, or not,
and, if not, whether the observed click distribution is due to Primacy
and Recency Order Effects [11, 80], Authority/Trust Bias [58], or Sat-
isficing [35]. Typically, researchers investigating this phenomena,
perform experiments where results items are swapped, or result
lists are reversed, to tease out the different effects [11, 35, 58].
Pan et al. [58] claim that Position Bias arises because results are
ranked in decreasing ordering of their probability of relevance [64],
and over time search engines have learnt to rank the most relevant
items first [31]. They suggest that taking the first result item re-
turned is an example of a “fast and frugal heuristic that exploits the
regularity of the information environment” [58]. So the trust people
have in the search engine is proportional to the probability of result
items being relevant, which is learnt from repeated interactions
with the search engine. Thus, Pan et al. [58] assert that searcher’s
trust in the system is not unfounded or irrational. Instead they posit
that by favouring the highly ranked items because they are more
likely to be relevant will reduce the total amount of time and effort
locating relevant information. Keane et al. [35] argue that searchers
are satisficers: and will click on the first item or first relevant look-
ing item that they encounter, rather than being maximizers who
compare all results items before clicking on the best item. In line
with the assertion by Pan et al. [58], Keane et al. [35] also suggest
that the position bias is dependent on relevance — and when the
relevance of the top results is reduced they observed that people
are less likely to click them — suggesting that they do not always
(or all) naively click the first result.
On the other hand, Wu et al. [80] contest this view, and suggest
that if people abide by Zipf’s Law, then they would seek to obtain
the maximum benefit with the minimum effort. And so, when in-
formation seeking, Zipf-like distributions should result because
of the trade-off between the benefit and effort, where people are
less likely to seek information if it requires more effort to obtain it.
Wu et al. [80] posit that the click distribution is not strictly Zipfian
due to Primacy and Recency Position Effects. They observed that
the first link receives the most clicks, but the tenth link on the
page receives more that the 9th link, while the 11th link which
is on the subsequent page receives more clicks than the 10th or
9th. Their statistical analysis of web search log data shows that the
click distribution actually violates Zipf’s Law which they attribute
to Primacy and Recency Effects. We summarize these findings and
hypotheses below:
E1 Position Bias is proportional to the likelihood of results being rel-
evant [35, 58]. If the relevance of top results decreases, searchers
are less likely to click them [35].
E2 It is hypothesized that searchers minimize the cost of their
search by favouring high ranked items (and thus, searchers
should follow Zipf’s Law) [58].
E3 However, if searchers exhibit Primacy and Recency Order Effects
then it will lead to deviations from Zipf’s Law [80].
E4 When searching for answers to factoid questions like “Who
invented java?” people tend to satisfice and take the first re-
sult with a credible answer, rather than trying to find the best
possible result (i.e. maximise)4. [35].
3.5 Cognitive Biases when Judging Relevance
Commissioning relevance assessments to train and evaluate Infor-
mation Retrieval systems is another area where researchers have
been concerned that (cognitive) biases may have an impact on the
quality of judgements (which may then have downstream effects
on training and evaluating ranking models). For most studies, paid
assessors are used to perform the annotations given a set of guide-
lines – and in most studies, these assessors are paid per label, and
they are only paid, if their work is of sufficient quality – this creates
an incentive structure which might exacerbate or interact with
cognitive biases. These annotation studies have found that:
A1 Assessors tend to rate more well known sites like Wikipedia
as more relevant [29, 34] (referred to as Domain Bias [29] but
can be attributed Ambiguity Bias as unknown sites have more
uncertainty associated with them).
A2 Assessors rate more detailed result summaries as more relevant
than results that are missing features such as title, domain, etc.
(Ambiguity Bias) [17]
A3 Priming assessors by showing them examples of low relevance
items, tended to result in assessors rating subsequent items
more highly, than if they were shown highly or moderately
relevant items first (Priming Effects) [67, 69].
A4 After assigning a relevance label to the result summary, assessor
tended to anchor on their initial judgement when assessing the
document (Anchoring Bias) – and this resulted in lower accuracy
compared to gold standard labels [17].
A5 When two non-relevant items were shown with a relevant item,
but one non-relevant item was clearly inferior to the other (i.e.
the decoy), then assessors tended to rate the dominate non-
relevant document as more relevant (Decoy Effect) [17].
A6 When information on previous assessor decisions was provided
(e.g. % of assessors who said the item was relevant) along with
the result summary, the assessors tended to rate the document
in a similar fashion, even if the % data was fabricated (Anchoring
Bias and Bandwagon Effects) [17, 27].
4However, it is not really clear what the best possible result would be in this context
since to complete the task participants only had to find a result with the answer to for
instance, “Who invented Java?”, and not say a more information result that contained
the entire history of Java, which may be more informative.
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A7 When actual/true information regarding previous assessors
decisions was provided (e.g. the true % of assessors who said
the item was relevant), a stronger effect was observed such that:
as the true % increased, then the probability of a new asses-
sor labelling the item as relevant also increased proportionally
(Bandwagon Effects) [27]. This suggests that when the infor-
mation is believed to be genuine or is more credible it is more
likely to influence assessor decisions.
A8 When actual/true information was provided, the accuracy of
judgements increased and assessors were more confident in
their judgements [27].
A9 When training ranking algorithms using the labels from asses-
sors who used interfaces designed to induce cognitive biases, it
resulted in lower performance compared to using labels, where
assessors used a neutral interface5 [17].
3.6 Cognitive Biases on Search Satisfaction
It has been shown that commonly used metrics in Information Re-
trieval, which are based on Expected Utility, tend to correlate poorly
with search satisfaction [2]. Cognitive biases may be responsible
for this deviation, however, there has been little work examining
how cognitive biases impact upon satisfaction [39, 49, 56].
Kelly et al. [39] investigated whether priming users by providing
feedback on their performance with the system influenced their
satisfaction ratings. When told they performed very well (i.e. better
than what was measured), ratings increased, while when told they
performed poorly, ratings decreased, suggesting that participants
were susceptible to the priming. However, they also observed that
ratings were higher when no feedback was given compared to
when their actual performance was given as feedback. They posit
that Method Bias stemming from the experimental setting and the
experimental design (i.e. participants are performing a task in an ar-
tificial environment) [60] may explain why participants give higher
ratings on average (resulting in an Inflation Bias). This inflation
bias could be problematic when comparing ratings between sys-
tems, if the relative differences are not proportional to the ratings.
However, when novel search interfaces, with clear interventions,
are compared to baseline interfaces, participants may fall prey to
Novelty Bias [15], leading to a disparity in the inflationary effects.
Oulasvirta et al. [56] investigated the Paradox of Choice [68] in
the context of web search. In their study, they presented partici-
pants with search result lists containing either six result items or
twenty four result items, from which participants had to select one
result item. While search result lists of other sizes were not exam-
ined, they hypothesized that an inverted U-Shaped relationship
between the number of results and satisfaction exists, such that
too few choices or too many choices would lead to greater dissatis-
faction. They found that participants reported greater satisfaction,
greater confidence and greater consideration of items when result
pages contained six items, suggesting that less is more. However,
the experimental setting put participants into a maximiser vs satis-
ficer scenario, forcing them to select one, and only one result item
(similar to the assumption made by Keane et al. [35], see §3.4). In a
naturalistic setting, where users may wish to click on and inspect a
5Performance was in terms of nDCG calculated using “gold” labels fromNIST assessors.
number of items, this may not necessarily be the case, and it may
even increase the cost of browsing [6, 37].
More recently, Liu and Han [49] investigated whether Reference
Dependence Effects influenced participants satisfaction. Reference
Dependence effects manifest when people view gains and losses
with respect to a reference point, rather than the absolute gains or
losses (as assumed under Expected Utility theory). They examined
several datasets where participants had performed search tasks and
provided satisfaction ratings. They found evidence to suggest that
participant’s satisfaction was significantly influenced by their peak
gain or peak loss, and their final end gain or loss (Peak-End Rule).
S1 Participants tend to rate experimental systems more highly, es-
pecially if the system is novel (Inflation and Novelty Biases) [39].
S2 When participants have to choose only one item, they were
less satisfied when many results were shown, than when fewer
results were shown (Less is More Effect) [56].
S3 Peak and end events act as reference points which can influence
participant’s search satisfaction ratings (Peak-End Rule) [49].
4 DISCUSSION AND CRITICAL REFLECTION
In the previous sections we have highlighted some of the major
findings observed across different domains and different parts of the
search process – it is clear that cognitive biases influence people’s
information seeking and retrieval behaviours and the subsequent
decisions that they make to some degree or another – and these
cognitive biases can be exacerbated when interacting with algo-
rithmically biased search engines that serve up biased content.
However, it should be pointed out that the above findings are ten-
dencies, which may lead to an increase in errors beyond what is
expected according to rational decision making theories (but not
always and not for all searchers). Most of the studies in Table 1 have
focused on examining the negative impacts of cognitive biases on
search. However, cognitive biases can also have a positive impact
(A7, Q4), which can potentially and presumably result in more suc-
cessful outcomes in the long run (E1, E2) — however, further work
is needed to investigate the positive impacts. Below, we discuss a
number of open questions, issues and challenges in investigating
cognitive biases in information seeking and retrieval.
Do cognitive biases compound with each other or conflict?
The cognitive biases which seem to have the biggest impact ap-
pear to be Anchoring Bias, Confirmation Bias, Ambiguity Effects and
Exposure Effects which have been observed in different contexts
influencing searchers in similar ways. It also appears that certain
biases are hard to distinguish because they are often observed to-
gether, and potentially lead to compounding effects. For example,
Availability Bias and Exposure Effects tend to be linked, because
the availability created by presenting documents with a certain
point of view in the result list, coupled with a searcher engaging
with a number of those results, can lead to a shift or sway in the
searcher’s opinions and beliefs (HM5, SP5, SP6). While Confirma-
tion Bias and Information Avoidance Bias tend to combine together
as searchers avoid conflicting opinions, but will seek out opinions
that are consistent with their beliefs (HM8, SP1). Anchoring Bias
and Primacy Bias also tend to co-occur, or at least are conflated
with each other, as the first item presented in a result list is often
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considered the most relevant, and may serve as an anchor that
influences how searchers answer questions (HM3, E1). We also
observed that there can be a tension between different cognitive
biases. For example, despite participants anchoring towards a partic-
ular belief and performing repeated searches to try to confirm their
beliefs, they succumbed to exposure effects as the search engine
deliberately returned results inconsistent with their beliefs (H6).
Participants who made an initial decision on who to vote for (an-
chor) were also swayed by Exposure and Primacy Effects. However,
when assessors provided an initial judgement, they stuck to their
initial anchor despite other manipulations (A4). As such, a number
of open questions arise when considering cognitive biases in ISR
settings: Which of these cognitive biases compound together and
lead to better or worse outcomes? Which biases compete against
each other? Do they wash each other out? Or, do certain cognitive
biases dominate over others?
Is it easier to manipulate or mitigate cognitive biases? Some
answers can be found by examining the findings from studies that
have tried to mitigate different cognitive biases. These works sug-
gest that some biases appear to be more deeply ingrained, or that
the intervention was not appropriate to mitigate the bias. For ex-
ample, while health search interfaces could help minimize Order
Effects, searchers a priori beliefs were harder to overcome (e.g. An-
choring Bias), whereas trying to mitigate Confirmation Bias actually
led to Information Avoidance Bias (Q6). On the other hand, stud-
ies in which researchers have deliberately created interfaces and
scenarios to identify or detect different cognitive biases have been
largely successful (HM3,HM5, SP6, A3-6, E3, S2). These findings
suggest that it is harder to mitigate cognitive biases and their nega-
tive effects, than it is to manipulate cognitive biases and exacerbate
their negative effects. However, greater manipulations also require
greater experimentation control which limits their ecological va-
lidity. For example, in [19], they claim that undecided voters may
be swayed by 20% or more towards a particular candidate (SP6).
However, participants were only presented with one list of results
where the ordering had been manipulated (to favour one or another
candidate). Participants could not issue their own queries – so even
if they wanted to they were unable to take other actions that may
have mitigated the biases imposed by the lists presented to them.
On the other hand, providing initial results which contain factually
correct answers help to improve the accuracy of searchers when
answering medical questions (HM3, HM5). Essentially, it is very
much an open question how much influence search engine manip-
ulations can actually effect searcher opinions, beliefs and decisions
in naturalistic and ecologically valid settings. But worryingly, it
appears that leading searchers to incorrect/poorer conclusions by
manipulating their cognitive biases, is easier than mitigating cogni-
tive biases to help lead searchers to the correct/better conclusions.
Are searchers more susceptible to cognitive biases if they
have no skin in the game? It may be that the effects observed in
the controlled and artificially constructed experimental scenarios
may be because the participants are not intrinsically motivated to
find out whether, for example, “cinnamon helps diabetes” or not.
However, if a person has been recently diagnosed with Type II
Diabetes, then they have a clear motivation for learning about their
condition, the possible treatments and seeking advice on dealing
with the condition. In this case, would they really satisfice and take
one and only one answer provided by the search engine (E3, S2)?
More likely, they will undertake many search sessions, issue many
queries, examine many different articles, as well as discuss issues
with their friends, family and medical providers. Of course, they
may avoid certain results when searching ( Information Avoidance
Bias) or only select results that confirm their prior beliefs (Confirma-
tion Bias), but it is largely unknownwhat the actual influence would
be when the searcher’s health is at stake. Another possibility may
be that some/most participants in these experimental studies may
be looking to do the experiment as quickly as possible, so they can
claim the payment and leave. In this case the motivations are not
necessarily aligned with the experimental context, and this could
lead to observing more cognitive biases, or more pronounced ef-
fects from such cognitive biases. But perhaps reassuringly, the more
effort the participants put into their search task, the more accurate
their answers (HM7) suggesting that if they do try harder they are
more likely to reach a better outcome/correct answer. Nonetheless,
these points emphasize that care needs to be taken when designing
and conducting such experiments, so that they aren’t subject to
Method Bias [60] or the Observer-Expectancy Effects [65].
On that note, are we, as ISR researchers, also cognitively bi-
ased when performing studies on cognitive bias in ISR? It
is important to take a step back and ask this meta-question, and
consider whether we as researchers are falling foul to the Observer-
Expectancy Effect [65]. This is where experimenters can suffer a
form of Confirmation Bias, incorrectly interpreting results to see
patterns and trends that conform to their hypotheses, rather than
considering alternative hypotheses. In the following discussion
points, we critically examine some of the past findings and con-
sider whether there may be alternative explanations for the results
observed in previous studies as a way to highlight the difficulties
in determining whether the influence is due to cognitive biases or
due to some other cause. Taking, for example, some of the findings
from studies on health searchers, where it was suggested that peo-
ple tend to issue positively framed queries (HM1), such as “Does
cinnamon help diabetes?”, and then select confirmatory results (H2),
which in turn increases their likelihood of giving incorrect answers
(H3,H5). But, are there other explanations or other factors that
might account for these observations?
Are positively framedqueries an example of projection bias?
Over time searchers have interacted with search engines which has
resulted in learning what kinds of queries tend to work, vs. what
kinds of queries don’t work (through Operant Conditioning [71]).
Predominately, people are conditioned by the search engines to
favour keyword based queries such that searchers find documents
which contain those keywords, where as more complex queries
involving “not” or “NOT” operators are often misunderstood and
frequently used incorrectly. So perhaps the searcher by asking
queries is not so much projecting their belief that “cinnamon does
help diabetes” but actually, thinks that this query will retrieve rel-
evant information to address their underlying information need.
Maybe, they are suffering from a different cognitive bias? Or, maybe
they lack the domain knowledge to formulate a better query? For
example, it is probably cognitively less taxing to ask the search en-
gine: “Does caffeine help asthma?” and read casually written health
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articles, compared to formulating a more expressive and balanced
query like “Randomized controlled clinical trials on exercise induced
bronchoconstriction asthma participants involving caffeine as a treat-
ment” and read complex scientific articles (HM9, SP5).
Are searchers exhibiting confirmation bias because they se-
lect documents claiming the treatments are helpful? What
makes answering this question particularly difficult in a natural-
istic setting (such as via web search logs) is that there is a high
proportion of documents in the index that contain positive answers.
In fact, up to 80% of top ranked documents disproportionately
favour such results due to Content Bias [78]. This system-sided
bias may contribute to why searchers selected documents with
positive answers, as that is what was mainly shown, rather than
the searchers wanting to confirm their beliefs. However, in more
controlled experiments, similar findings have been observed, sug-
gesting that searchers are often being selective in the items that
they are examining, favouring ones that are consistent with their
beliefs and, thus, exhibiting Confirmation Bias (SP1) .
Did searchers have a different interpretation of the search
task? As previously mentioned, researchers used commonly posed
health questions, for which there was a clinical answer based on
Cochrane systematic reviews (the gold standard). For instance,
cinnamon is NOT an effective treatment for diabetes – and thus
was deemed as not helpful. So, if a participant said it was helpful,
their answer was considered incorrect by the researchers [46, 61].
This is because they assume that the participant’s understanding
of the search task, and the question that they had to answer, was
the same as theirs. However, participants may conclude cinnamon
is helpful because it can be used as substitute for sugar. Similarly,
while Aloe Vera is NOT a cure for cancer, participants may have
concluded it is helpful because it is effective in alleviating the pain
caused by chemotherapy burns. So, how much of the observed
inaccuracies are due to cognitive biases vs. misinterpretations of
the search task?
Domisaligned incentive structures lead assessors to employ
simple rules, or are they cognitively biased? When commis-
sioning annotations, the annotation platform would like high qual-
ity, unbiased, accurate labels for the minimum cost. However, the
assessors motivations are likely to be very different – earn as much
money as possible for the least amount of effort. Clearly, the asses-
sor’s motivations differ from the platform’s objectives. Furthermore,
it maybe that the annotation platform and the incentive structures
that it provides encourages assessors to take (mental) short cuts.
Let’s say that an assessor decides to universally employ a simple
rule, for example, to always label a item based on what the ma-
jority thought given the platform provides this information. Now,
let’s further assume that this rule leads to correctly labelling the
majority of labels most of the time (as per A7 and A8). Clearly,
employing this rule would then be beneficial to the assessor – as
they would be able to quickly label items reasonably accurately, and
earn a higher hourly wage (as many annotation platforms pay per
label, assuming the labelling is sufficiently accurate). On the other
hand, if this rule led to low accuracy, then they run the risk of not
meeting the quality threshold, and may not get paid. Essentially,
they would only apply this rule if it pays off. So a savvy assessor is
likely to game the system by creating simple rules to perform the
annotations quickly (e.g. rate results from well known sites higher,
if popular, rate higher, etc.), but do so consciously, as a way to
deliberately maximise their income (via system 2 thinking). On the
other hand, they may be unconsciously learning to quickly perform
annotations (via system 1 thinking). However, both would appear
to give the same empirical observations, but arise due to different
ways of thinking. So, are assessors jumping on the bandwagon, or
are they gaming the system?
Are searchers satisficers, maximisers or optimisers? In the
context of assessing result lists, it has been argued that searchers are
satisficers rather than maximisers (HM9, E3) – that is they tend to
select the first acceptable result, rather than compare all the results
and select the very best one. It was argued that this behaviour is
rational because searchers are subscribing the Principle of Least
Effort – and this leads to observing a Zipfian-like distribution of
clicks because searchers are less likely to seek information if more
effort is required. While Zipf’s law is not a perfect fit attributed
to Primacy and Recency Effects (E3), it does suggest that people
are trying to optimise their ISR. And, rather than trying to be a
maximiser by selecting the best possible result from a result list, it
may be that they are trying to be an optimiser where they seek to
maximise their rate of gain — which is one of the key assumptions
behind Information Foraging Theory [59] and other related models
of search based on Expected Utility [3, 4, 21]. However, there are
still many open questions: what objective function do searchers
employ? How does it change depending on the context? To what
extent do cognitive biases influence their objective function? And,
do certain cognitive biases lead to more efficient and/or effective
ISR, or not?
While it is impossible to discuss all the different issues that have
emerged during our review of the literature on cognitive biases
in search, we hope that these discussion points help the field to:
critically reflect upon the work being performed, highlight the
challenges in investigating this phenomena, and provide a strong
starting point for researchers wanting to explore cognitive biases
in future work.
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Cognitive Biases can play a major role in shaping and influencing
ISR behaviours and outcomes. This perspectives paper has outlined
the major works conducted in our field, cataloguing and describing
the different findings and assertions from over thirty studies. From
this review, it is clear that we, as a field, have only just scratched the
surface in understanding the complexities of cognitive biases in ISR.
And, that there are many challenges and open questions that need to
be addressed and answered going forward. We hope that this work
serves as inspiration for investigating the many complexities of this
phenomena exploring, for example, the impact of compounding
and conflicting cognitive biases, the negative and positive effects
of cognitive biases, and how cognitive biases can be mitigated (and
manipulated) to improve ISR behaviors and outcomes.
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